Escalating Commitment To Failing Financial Decisions: Why Does It Occur? by Morgan, John & Hansen, James
Journal of Business & Leadership: Research, Practice, and
Teaching (2005-2012)
Volume 2
Number 1 Journal of Business & Leadership Article 6
1-1-2006
Escalating Commitment To Failing Financial





Follow this and additional works at: http://scholars.fhsu.edu/jbl
Part of the Business Commons, and the Education Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FHSU Scholars Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Business &
Leadership: Research, Practice, and Teaching (2005-2012) by an authorized editor of FHSU Scholars Repository.
Recommended Citation
Morgan, John and Hansen, James (2006) "Escalating Commitment To Failing Financial Decisions: Why Does It Occur?," Journal of
Business & Leadership: Research, Practice, and Teaching (2005-2012): Vol. 2 : No. 1 , Article 6.
Available at: http://scholars.fhsu.edu/jbl/vol2/iss1/6
Journal of Business and Leadershi p: Research, Pracuce, and Teach in g 
2006, Vol. 2, No. I , 37 -4 5 
ESCALATING COMMITMENT TO FAILING FINANCIAL DECISIONS: WHY DOES IT 
OCCUR? 
John Morgan, Winona State University 
James Hansen, Minnesota State University-Moorhead 
Research indicates inappropriate escalation of commitment to apparently failing decisions occurs in many 
areas of life. Examples include doubling-up blackjack bets to recover losses, the too lengthy Vietnam War 
debacle, and the tendency to continue with finan cial in vestments long after they appear to be failing. 
What motivates such behavior? Two theories preselltly compete as major e.\:p/auations for this behavior: 
the self-justification the01y and the prospect the01y . This paper compares the two theories to determine 
which the01y better predicts escalation behaviors within au uu-confouuded and unambiguous comext. 
The research is motivated by the belief that understanding why people escalate is prerequisite to 
successfully developing strategies for mitigating the damages of escalation. Results show, that after 
removing the confounding effects of framing differences across conditions, prospect theory better predicts 
escalation than does self-justification the01y within the context tested. 
INTRODUCTION 
It has long been knovm that fi nancial managers 
sometimes utilize accounting and fi nancial information in 
less than optimal ways, and as a result, make poor 
financial decisions. One area of sub-optimal dec ision 
making has been the observed tendency to esca late 
commitment to failin g fin ancial choices even though 
accounting and fin ancial info m1ation suggest it may be 
time to abandon the investment. Users of fi nancia l 
information are well served by understanding what is 
k:novvn about the causes of esca lat ion since it is a starti ng 
point in developing strategies to avoid the sometimes 
di sastrous consequences of inappropriate escalation . 
Staw reported the earliest empirica l ev idence of 
escalating commitment to fa i I ing financial dec isions 
(Staw, 1976) . Staw noted that ind ividuals with hi gh 
personal responsibili ty for earlier and apparently fail ing 
financial deci sions di spl ayed more commitmen t to them 
than others having littl e or no personal responsibili ty for 
the earlier decisions. Staw in fened the relati ve ly higher 
commitment to fa iling deci sions by hi gh responsibil ity 
decision-makers resulted from se!f-jusrificorion In 
accordance with Aronson's self-j ustifica tion theory 
(Aronson, 1976, 1968). Aronson 's self-j ustifi cation 
theory itself was an extension of Festin ger's we ll 
establi shed and widely accep ted dissonance theory 
(Festinger, 195 7). 
Self-justifi ca tion theory says people fee l threa tened by 
their mi stakes and are reluctant to admi t mi stakes even to 
themse lves. Se lf-j usti fi cati on ays the re luctance to 
recogn ize personal mi stakes protects the ego from the 
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dissonance that accompa nies personal fai lure. Staw 
in ferred the escalation behaviors he observed in his 1976 
expenmen t resulted from thi s self-justification 
phenomenon. Staw's inference (i.e. escalation results 
fro m self-j ustification/ego-defense) has been widely 
accepted by others, and is still commonl y cited in 
escalation li terature. The esca lation tendencies first 
observed by Staw are we ll documented and have been 
extended in experiments by Staw and Fox ( 1977), 
Caldwell and O 'Re ill y ( 1982). Davis and Bobko ( 1986). 
Brockner ( 1992) , Beeler and Hunton ( 1997). Geiger, 
Robin on, and lrwi n ( 1998), and Cheng, Schulz. Luckett, 
and Booth (2003) . 
However, there is a second competing explanation for 
esca lati nn behav iors which has al so gai ned wide 
acceptance in esca lation literature. Thi expl ana ti on, 
known as prospect theo1y (Kahnema n and Tversk:y, 
1979), altii butes different reasons for escalation 
behaviors . Prospect theory says that dec ision-makers 
natL!ra ll y select and utilize di fferent decision utili ty 
functions depending on their cunent state of wealth 
rela tive to an initial state of wea lth. According to 
prospect theory, dec ision makers are naturally risk-
seeking when ma king deci sions that may recover losses 
to an ini ti al wealth state and wi ll take more risk:, than 
norma l to attempt thi s. Prospect theory be lieves th is is a 
widespread and na tural human tendency and is not 
dependent upon persona l ego in vo lvement for efficacy in 
pred icti ng behavior. 
Add itionall y, when making decisions to preserve an 
in iti al wealth state (or to protect gai ns to an initial wealth 
state). prospect the01y says dec ision-makers are naturall y 
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risk averse and demonstrate reluctance to take ri sks that 
jeopardizes initia l wea lth . Put another way, in the domain 
of wea lth preservation peopl e are naturall y ri sk averse, 
but in the domain of recovering losses to initial wea lth, 
they are naturall y ri sk seeking. T hese diffe ring dec ision 
uti lit ies, accord ing to prospect theory, are natural and 
descriptive and do not require personal ego in vo lvement 
in earli er dec isions. 
Prospect theory predi ctions are we ll documented . 
Empirical tests in a va ri ety of contexts show the ir 
accuracy including Kahneman and Tversky ( 1979, 1984) , 
Tversky and Kahneman ( 198 1, 1986) , Northcraft and 
Neale ( 1986), Garl and ( 1990) , Schaubroeck and Davi s 
( 1994), Johnstone (2002) , Moreno, Kidda , and Smith 
(2002), and C hang, Yen , and Duh (2002). 
There is a thi rd less accepted theory of esca lati on 
ca lled sunk cost theory . Sunk cost theory pos its 
esca lation is a fom1 of pers istence in deci s ion-making, 
which may be a cri ti ca l c lement of success in busin ess in 
the long-run even if resulting in suboptimal short run 
deci sions (Fox, Shaul , Hoffma n, and Michae l, 2002). 
Wl1ile thi s line of reasoning is interesting, it does not 
serve the present resea rch goa l of pitting self-justi fication 
theory against prospect theory, and therefore is not 
developed futi her here or incorporated into the re ea rch 
des ign of thi paper . 
Bazerman was perhaps the first to sugges t prospect 
theory is an a ltemate explanation for esca lation behaviors 
(Bazem1an, 1984 ). Whyte developed spec ifi c argumen ts 
detai ling how prospect theory ex plain s the particular 
esca lation beha viors observed by Staw in 1976 w ithin th e 
context of the A & S Financial Dec is ion Case used by 
Staw in that experimen t (Whyte. 19 6, 1993). Whyte 
further point , out prospect theory is a more parsimoniou s 
exp lanation of esca lation , and th erefore, pre fe rabl e. 
In Whyte's view ofescai::I ti on. the behav iors observed 
by Staw were a natura l result o f decision-m::~kers having 
selected different dec ision utiliti es because one group 
framed deci s ions as recovering losses (i .e . were ri sk 
seeking) and the other gro up framed deci s ions as 
preserving wea lth (i.e. were r isk ave rse). More 
spec ificall y, high respons ibility subjec ts escala ted , not 
because of persona l ego in vo lve ment , but beca use they 
viewed their dec is ion as at tempt in g to recover lo ses 
from the initi a l wea lth sta te ex istin g when they m::~d e 
their ea r!J er dec is ion. Thus. they we re na tura ll y ri sk-
seek ing in a tt emptin g to recover the ir l o ~scs. O n the o ther 
han d, low persona l respon s ibility subjec ts framed the ir 
dec is ions as prese rvi ng an initial wc::~ lth state exi sting at 
the point these subjec ts fi rst became persona ll y in vo lved 
in the A & S Financ ia l Dec is ion Case, the point of th e 
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second dec ision. In order to preserve their initial wealth 
they were naturall y ri sk averse . According to Wllyte, ego 
defense is not needed to explain the observed escalation 
behaviors. Dec ision fra ming differences explains it. 
Chang, Ho, and Lin , reviewed esca lation literature and 
point out that both sel f-j usti fication theory and prospect 
theory continue as major explanations for escalation 
(Chang, Ho, and Lin , 2002). Both theories are c ited as 
continuing ac tive resea rch streams. 
It is inte resti ng to note that no empirical evidence was 
presented by Wllyte in 1986 or 1993 to support his 
theoreti ca l arguments in support of prospect theory. 
Furthem1ore, to date no unambiguous empirical evidence 
has been reported in academi c literature that directly and 
unambi guous ly contrasts the two theori es after removing 
the confounding effec ts of frami ng differences across 
groups. T he purpose of this research is to do just that. We 
test prospec t theory predictions agai n t self-justification 
predi ction within the context of Staw 's original A & S 
Financia l Dec ision Case after removing fram ing 
d iffe rences. \' ..: ask, what are the pattem s of esca lation 
between high personal respons ibility and low personal 
respons ibility subjects (with negative feedback) if 
deci s ion fram ing differences acros the two groups have 
been removed. Self- justi fica ti on theory and prospect 
theory make very different pred ic tion about outcomes 
under these cond iti on If se lf-j ustifi cation is the so le 
reason for escalating commitment, then high personal 
responsibili ty dec ision-makers wi ll esca late more than 
low respon sib il ity deci si on-makers to se lf-justify their 
past ac tions . O n the o ther hand , if prospect theory a lone 
exp la in s esca la ti on , hi gh persona l re pons ibility subjec ts 
and low re pons ibiliry subjects who have framed 
deci s ion similarl y as recovering losses wi ll make similar 
deci s io ns beca use both gro ups have se lected and used the 
sa me deci s ion utili ty functi on in their decisions. A thjrd 
poss ibi lit y that is cons idered is that both se lf-just ification 
and prospect theory may be independent sources of 
esca l ::~tio n behavior. 
Hypothesis Development 
In thi s section the methods and hypotheses for testing 
W hyte's and Staw 's sepa rate theori es for esca lat ing 
commitment arc di scussed. To test the differing 
esca la tion theori es, two independent variab le are 
manipul ated: RES PONS rBILITY (either hi gh or low 
personal respons ibility for an earli er dec ision) and 
1:EEDBAC K (ei ther nega ti ve or pos iti ve feedback with 
respec t to that ea rl ier dec is ion) . The e are the same two 
va ri ab les manipul ated by S taw in hi s 1976 A & S 
Financia l Deci s ion Case. Furthem1ore, we have used the 
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same exact case facts as used by Staw in the A & S 
Financial Decision Case. The difference between our 
experiment and the 1976 Staw experiment relates only to 
its expanded design which includes not one, but two sets 
of low responsibility subj ects. The add itional set of low 
responsibility subj ects is intentionally induced to frame 
the continuing investment dec ision as recovering losses, 
similar to high responsibili ty subj ects, thus eliminating 
the confound of framin g differences across groups. 
This design change deserves further elaboration. One 
set of low responsibili ty subj ects are to ld an earli er 
investment deci sion has been made by a fo rmer vice 
president (i .e. former vice pres ident condition) . Thi s 
condition exactly replicates Staw 's low responsibili ty 
condition. A second set of low responsibility subjects are 
established who are induced to be li eve the ea rli er 
investment decision was made, not by a former vice-
president, but by their teammate in a case competiti on 
being completed in two person teams (i.e . tea mmate 
condition) . Subjects in thi s condition (and all conditi ons) 
are told the A & S F inancia l Decision Case is being 
completed in t\vo person teams and results are to be 
evaluated at the team leve l. The negative feedback they 
receive about their teammate 's in vestment dec is ion 
affects their team standing. T he design add iti on is 
entirely for the purpose of creating a set of low persona l 
responsibility subj ects who believe they are recovering 
losses (albeit team losses) to an initial tea m wea lth 
state. 
By including low responsibili ty subjects who fra me 
simil arly to hi gh responsibility subj ects (i .e. recovering 
losses), we can directly and unambiguously test whether 
high personal responsibility subj ects esca late more than 
low personal responsibili ty subj ects for reasons o f self-
justification. If both groups have framed in the same way, 
framing di fferences cannot ex pla in the esca lation and do 
not confound the result. If, under these conditions, high 
personal responsibili ty subj ects esca late more than lovv 
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responsibility subj ects it is stTOn g suppoti for se lf-
justificati on theory. On the other hand , if hi gh personal 
responsibili ty subj ects do not escal ate more than low 
responsibili ty subj ects when framin g di fferences are 
removed, then se l f-j usti fi ca ti on theory is apparentl y not a 
viabl e explanation for esca lation a fter framing d iffe rences 
are removed . 
To strengthen the moti va ti on of subj ec ts to give their 
best efforts in completing the expanded A & S Financial 
Decision Case, all subj ects were to ld they cou ld earn up 
to ten extra credit poin ts for completing the dec ision case 
accord ing to the fo llow ing gui de lines: 10 extTa-credit 
poi nts for submitting top quartil e so luti ons, 8 extra-cred it 
points for second quarti le so luti ons, 6 extra-c red it points 
for third quartil e, and 4 extra-cred it po ints for foutih 
quartil e so lu tions. A ll subj ects were told the extra-credit 
points were eamed at a team leve l. At the end of the 
expetiment, everyone in fact received 10 extra-credi t 
points for parti c ipating, and in rea li ty there were no teams 
though thi s was not known until after comp leting the 
case. 
It should be noted Wl1yte's prospect theory analysi s of 
the Staw result covered only nega ti ve feedback 
conditions. Positi ve feedback condi tions were inelevant 
to expla ining why peop le esca late and therefore were no t 
included. Nevertheless, prospect theory wo ul d predic t 
hi gh and low responsibi li ty subj ec ts rece ivin g pos iti ve 
feedback would perceive themselves to be in the domain 
o [ preserving wea lth or preserv in g ga ins to wea lth. ln 
bo th cases these subj ects would be ri sk-averse acco rding 
to prospect theory. On the other hand, subj ects receivin g 
nega ti ve feedback fa ll into two d iffe rent ca tegories in 
terms of framing ex pec tations: those recoverin g losses to 
an initi al wea lth state (ri sk-seeking tea mmate subj ects) 
and those mainta in ing an initi a l wea lth state (risk-averse 
former vice pres ident subj ects). Tab le l summari zes our 
expectations about dec is ion framing and decision ut ilities 
in the s ix ex perimental cond itions. 
Table 1: Prospect Theory - Summary of Fra ming E ffects 
High Responsibility 
Positive Feedba ck Frame: Preserving gains 
and risk averse 
Esca late? No 
Negative Feedback Frame: Recovering losses 
and risk seek1ng 
Esca lat e"? Yes 
(Fo rmer V I') Low Rcsponsibilitv 
Frame: Pre:-.crving Jlli{Ja! wealth 
and n sk 3\'Cr ::,c 
Esca lat e? NL1 
Frame: Presc..:rv 1ng 111it1al \\ C3lth 
and n sk averse 
Esca lalt"? No 
Fra me : Pn.:servm g. g~lln ::, and nsh :l\ 'LTsC 
E"' al a te? No 
Fra me: Rcco\ cnng ln.-.scs and nsh. ..,cd .. mg 
Esca la l<'"? Vc, 
The lower ri ght-hand ce ll in table contains an theory pred icts no csca l ~1l i o n by lo\\' respon sibility 
subjects with negative feedback s ince IO\\' respon s ibility 
subj ec ts by definiti on have no perso nal responsibi lity lor 
the past dec isions . Prospec t theo ry on th t.: other hand 
important and testab le predi ction wh ich in fom1s our 
desire to contrast the efficacies of se lf-just ificati on and 
prospect theory in predi cting escalation. Se lf-j ustifi ca ti on 
39 
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predicts these pa ti icul ar low respons ibility subjects wi ll 
be ri sk eeking to recover team losses and w ill esca late. 
Hy pothes is 1 compares high responsibili ty and low 
respons ibility-former vice pres ident subjects exactl y as 
S taw did in 1976. 
Hypothesis 1: T here wi ll be a s ignificant 
interaction between RESPONSIBILITY and 
FEEDBACK when compari ng hi gh 
responsibility subjects w ith low respons ibility-
forme r vice president subjects . T he direction of 
the interaction wi ll be high respons ibili ty 
subjects esca late more than low responsibili ty-
fanner vice pres ident subjec ts in the nega tive 
feedback condition on ly . 
If confinned , Hypothes is 1 rep licates Staw 's mai n 
1976 finding in the present experimental context and with 
the present set of subj ec ts and instruc tion s involv ing 
teammate . 
Our second hypothesis (the main hypothes is) contrasts 
Whyte's fra ming predic tio ns with Staw 's se lf-
justi fication predict ions afte r removing the potentia l 
confound of fram ing differences across groups. High 
respons ibili ty subj ec ts a re compared to low 
respons ibility-teammate subjects, both who are fra ming 
to recover losses. T he results of H ypo thes is 2 infonn the 
main ques ti on of thi s experiment. Do hi gh and low 
re pon ibility subj ects who have framed in a similar ri sk 
seeking way demonstrate s ignifica ntl y different levels of 
con tinuing commitment to ear lier dec is ion after negative 
feedback due to se lf-j ustifica ti on of past actions? 
Hypothes is 2 ass umes that prospec t theory is cotTcct and 
no esca lation w ill occur after fram ing differences are 
removed . 
Hypothesis 2: There w ill not be a s ignificant 
interaction between RESPONSIBILITY and 
FEEDBACK for hi gh respons ibili ty subj ec ts 
and low responsibili ty-a nonymous teamma te 
subject s. 
Our third ami fina l hypothes is provides one add iti ona l 
te st of prospec t theory. Since low responsibility-
teammate subjects a re ex pec ted to frame in terms of 
recovering losses to an initial tea m wea lth sta te, and wi ll 
the refo re be risk-see king , a nd s ince low respons ibility-
former ,·icc pres ident subj ec ts are be li eved to frame in 
te rms of ma mta inmg an initi a l wea lth stale , and w ill 
therefore be ri sk-averse, it fo ll ows the two low 
respons ibi lity groups wi ll ha ve d iffe ring leve ls of 
conttnuing com mitment to past dec is ions under 
40 
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conditions of negative feedback. Accordingly, we predict 
the reappearance an interaction in these two groups and 
in the same direction as before due to framing differences 
a lone. 
H ypothesis 3: There will be a significant 
interaction between RESPONSIBILITY and 
FEEDBACK when comparing low 
responsibility-anonymous teammate subjects 
with low responsibility -fom1er vice president 
subjects. T he direction of the interaction will be 
low responsibility-anonymous teammate 
subjects esca late more than low responsibility-
fom1er vice pres ident subjec ts in the negative 
feedback cond iti on. 
Shou ld Hypothes is I prove true, this experiment 
replicates Staw ' s main 1976 finding of escalation using 
different subj ects. Should hyp othesis 2 (the main 
hypothes is) prove tTue, and esca lation behaviors 
di sappear afte r removing frami ng differences across 
conditions, it ca ll s into question se lf-justification as an 
ex pl anation for what has been ob erved, but supports a 
prospec t theory and fram ing explanation. Finally, if 
Hypothes is 3 proves true, the o nl y explanation for 
esca lat ion differences between two low responsibi lity 
groups is prospect theory and fram ing differences. Self-
justifi ca tion cannot ex plain esca lation by subj ects who 
have no earli e r persona l respo nsib i I it y for past decisions. 
Experimental Design 
A ll hypotheses are tested u ing the deci sion facts of 
Staw's 1976 A & S F inanc ia l Deci s ion Case. Independent 
variab les manipula ted are RESPONSffilLITY --hi gh or 
low respon sibili ty (but w ith two types of low 
respon s ibi lity) , and FEEDBACK--positi ve or nega tive 
feedback. A ll subj ects were given the same instructions 
and led to believe the case was being so lved in two 
person tea ms. High respon sibili ty subjects were given the 
first half of the A & S Fi nancia l Decis ion Case and 
requested to se lec t one of two corporate di vis ions, 
consumer or industri a l, to rece ive a ll o f a I 0 million 
do ll a r resea rc h a ll ocation. After making the decision, 
hi gh respons ibili ty subj ec ts were provided pos iti ve or 
nega tive feedback , and then req uired to make a second 
dec is ion in w hi ch they a ll ocated another 20 milli on 
resea rch dollars a ll o r in part to e ither of the two 
corporate div is ions. 
Low responsibility-former vice president subjects 
began the deci s ion case by read ing abo ut a fo m1er vice 
pres ident who made a I 0 mi II ion dollar research 
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allocation to one of two corporate divi s ions, consumer or 
industrial , based on the same facts made avai lab le to high 
responsibility subj ec ts. Next, feedback positive or 
negative was then provided. The key difference betvveen 
this group and the high responsibi li ty group was that a 
former vice president made the first deci sion rather than 
subjects, themselves. At thi s point, low 
responsibility-former vice president subjects were asked 
to allocate another 20 million research dollars a ll or in 
part to either of the two corporate divi sions. 
Low responsibility-teammate subjects were given 
the same facts and feedback as the low responsibili ty-
former vice pres ident condition except they were to ld 
their teammate in the case competiti on had made the 
initial 10 million dollar research deci sion (not an 
unlmown former vice president) . After receivi ng positive 
or negative feedback about the teammate 's deci s ion , low 
responsibility-teammate subj ects were asked to make a 
second 20 million dollar resea rch a ll ocation as in the 
other conditions. 
The dependent variable for a ll six condition s was the 
amount in dollars of the 20 million a llocated to the 
divi sion selected in the first deci sion ( i.e. a measure of 
the leve l of continuing commitment to an ea rli er 
deci s ion) . The experi mental approach for testing all three 
hypotheses was three fully randomized 2 X 2 factori a ls . 
Three- hundred-eighty-four undergraduate students 
recruited fro m multiple sections of sophomore/junior 
level business classes at three mid-westem univers iti es 
served as subj ects. Subj ects were randoml y ass igned to 
one of six conditions at the three sites and results were 
collapsed across ca mpuses for fina l analyses . Two 
hundred and twelve subjects were mal e; one hundred and 
seventy-two were female. The mean age of subj ects was 
20.8 years. No subjects from any s ite were debri efed 
until data had been fully co llected at a ll locations. The 
experiment itself was conducted during the first twenty-
five minutes of regular c lass periods. 
Manipulation Checks 
Manipulation checks were conducted to better 
understand the success of several critical aspects of the 
experi ment ' s manipulation s. These included subj ec ts ' 
perceptions about feedback type, perception s about leve l 
of personal responsibili ty for the first dec is ion , and 
perceptions in the low responsibility teammate conditi on 
about the need to support the tea mmate' s dec ision. 
Subjects se lf- reported each of these on a seven-point 
-II 
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Likert sca le immediatel y after the experiment it se lf 
had been conc luded and dec isions had been 
co llected . 
Se l f-j usti fi cation theory and prospec t theory both 
depend on subjects bein g abl e to di stin gu ish pos iti ve 
from nega tive feedback. Results of o ur manipul ation 
check show subj ects in positi ve feedback cond itions did 
perce ive feedback to be more positive (mean = 5.31) than 
subj ects in the negat ive feedback conditions (mean = 
2.59) (t = 15.76, p-va lue = .0001). The feedback 
manipul ation appears successful. 
Subj ects were also asked to describe their perceptions 
abo ut the leve l of persona l responsibi li ty they had for the 
first resea rch a llocation dec ision . It is important to be 
sure that low responsibili ty- fo rmer vice president 
subj ec ts and low responsibility-tea mmate subjects both 
percei ved low persona l responsibili ty fo r the earli er 
decis ion re lative to high responsibi li ty subj ects . l f thi s 
were not the case, feelings of inappropr iate high personal 
responsibili ty by low responsibi lity subjects may have 
confounded results and thereby di sa ll owed ruling out 
se lf-ju stifi cation as the cause for esca la tion. Results of 
our man ipul ati on check show hi gh responsibility subjects 
did perce ive s igni fican tl y hi gher per ona l responsibili ty 
for the first dec ision (mean = 5 .27) than e i tber of the tw o 
low responsibili ty groups-- low responsibil ity-former vice 
president (mean 1.70) and low responsibility-
anonymous tea mmate (mean = 1.50) (t = 18.96) , p-va1ue 
= .000 1 and (t = 20.87) , p-va lue = .000 1 respectivel y). 
Subjects in a ll six cond it ions appear to ha\·e perceived 
the ir leve l of personal responsib ili ty for first deci sion as 
intended . 
Lastl y. subjects in the teamma te condition were 
requested to self-report the degree to which they 
perce ived the ir con tinuing dec is ions had been infl uenced 
in any way by concerns abou t the op ini ons, feelings, or 
sense of socia l obliga tion to bac k up their unknown 
teammate ' s ear li er dec ision. S ubjec ts reported a very low 
leve l of concem abou t obligations to support the ir 
teammate 's dec isions with a mean core or 1.52 on a 
sca le of se en. Thi s reduces the plaus ibil it: of a con fo und 
re la ted to tea m dynamics all ect111g continu ing 
commitment and thereby confo unding resulh in some 
unkno\\'n way. 
Results 
Table 2 provides desc ri ptive s tati ~ ti C S lo r each or the 
s ix condi ti on s. 
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Table 2: Mean Escalation in Millions, STD. DEY., and Sa mple by Condition 
lligh Responsibilit y 
MEAN ; 8.34, S.D.; 4 16, n ; 64 
Tables 3, 4, and 5 pre ·ent resul ts of the three full y 
randomi zed 2 X 2 factorial analyses of va riance testing 
for the patterns or behavior predicted by the three 
hypo these 
Table 3: High Responsibility Subj ects with Low Responsibility-Former VP Subj ects 
(Note: thi s is the ori ginal 1976 Staw design) 
Summary Analysis or Variance (2 X 2 Factoria l) n = 256 
So ur·cc ss OF 
Responsibilit y I 06.993 I 
Feedba ck 353.675 I 
Two \ Vay Int er-act io n 11 0 38 1 I 
Residua l 426 1421 252 
Tota l ---- 255 
In tab le 3, hypothes is l is confirmed and esca lation 
has occ un·ed between hi gh responsibi lity and low 
responsib ility - former vice pres ident subj ec ts. The 
signifi cant interac ti on is s imil ar to was reported by Staw 
in 1976 between responsib ility and feedback (F ( I , 254) = 
6.527, p. = .0 I I ) . Hi gh respon ·ibility subjects esca lated 
MS F Signifi ca nce 
I 06.993 6.327 .0 13 
353.675 20.9 15 .000 
110.38 1 6.527 .0 11 
16.9 10 ---- ----
---- ---- ----
more than low responsibili ty-former vice pres ident 
subj ec ts but onl y in the negati ve feedback condition. Thi s 
repli ca tes Staw' s ma1n find ing from 1976 under 
conditions and ins'ructi ons of the current experiment. 
Tab le 4 gives the results of comparing hi gh responsibi li ty 
subj ec ts to low responsibility -teammate subj ects. 
Table 4: High Respo nsibility with Low Responsibility-Teamma te Subj ects 
Summary Analys is ofVwi ancc (2 X 2 Factorial) n = 25 6 
So ur-ce ss 
Rc,pon,ihilit y 57 191 
Feedback 7 18 9 10 
Two \ Vay lnh:n u:lio u 6 250 
Rc>idu a l 4090 ()~() 
T otal 
Tab le 4 shows high responsibility subjects h:lVe not 
esca lated more than low responsibil ity- teammate subj ec ts 
a fter remov ing fram ing diflcrcnccs whi ch con firms 
hypothesis 2. The signifi ca nt interac ti on ear li er observed 
between hi gh responsibi lity and low responsibility -






I\ IS F Signifi canCl' 
57 191 3.524 062 
7 18.9 10 44 .29-1 000 
6.250 .385 535 
16.230 
responsibility-teammate subjects who are induced to 
frame as recovering losses . Ta ble 4 shows the interacti on 
between responsibility and feedback is not signifi cant (F 
( I , 254) = .385, p. = .535) a fter framing is held constant. 
Tab le 5 below provide results comparing the two low 
responsibil ity groups at positive and nega ti ve feedback. 
Table 5: Low R esponsibility-Teamma te wit h Low Respo nsibilit y-Former V P 
Summary Ana lysis of Va rian ce (2 X 2 Factorial) n = 256 
Sou rei' ss 
lh·;po n>ihilit y 7.735 
Frt·dha (·k 265 S•>-1 
Twn Way lnlnac ti nn 64 . 100 
Hcsi tlual -10-14 140 
T utal 
ll ypothcs is 3 1s confirmed. Table 5 shows a 
si).!.'ni fi ca nt interaction between RESPONS II3 1LIT Y an d 
F ~EDI3i\CK when comparin g low responsibi li ty- former 





MS F Signifi cant(' 
7.735 .4 82 488 
265 89-1 16.568 .000 
64 100 3.90-1 0-1 7 
16.048 
subj ec ts (F ( I , 25-+) = 3.99-+ , p. .047). Low 
rcsponsibi I it y- tea mma te subj eels esca late more than low 
responsibi li ty-former vice president subj ec ts, but only in 
the nega ti ve feedback conditi on. 
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Low responsibility subjects induced to frame as 
recovenng from a teammate 's losses were more 
committed to their teammate 's earli er decision than were 
low responsibility subjects who be li eved a fom1er vice 
president made those deci sions, but onl y in the negative 
feedback condition. This result cannot be explained by 
self-justification since there is no personal responsibility 
for the earlier decision by either group. It is however 
predicted by prospect theory because differing deci sion 
frames are used by the two groups relative to initial 
wealth state. 
Implications and Discussion 
Escalation m financi al decision-making is a 
potentially di sastrous decision-making phenomenon . For 
researchers, a starting place must be to understand why 
escalation occurs. Making correct assumpti ons about the 
causes of escalation is a crucial first step towards 
predicting its occwTence and discovering approaches for 
mitigating its costs . We believe by better understanding 
the theoretical underpinnings of esca lation, the likelihood 
of making research progress towards its miti gation w ill 
be improved. A correct theoretical understanding of 
escalation causes affects the sorts of research questions 
asked, affects research designs employed to resolve those 
questions, and ultimately shapes the real-vvorld solutions 
developed to address the probl em. 
If it is true that escalation is the consequence of 
se lf-justifi cation of past action s, then strategies to contTol 
the ego involvement of dec ision makers in continuin g 
decisions are necessary . On the other hand, if escalation 
is only an artifact of dec ision framing, then stTategies 
which ensure carefu l and expli cit awareness of the 
potential for decision fra me bias be used. 
Results reported here seem fully consistent with 
Whyte's prospect theory in terpretation of esca lating 
commitment (Whyte, 1986). Our tests were made within 
the context of Staw ' s A & S Financia l Deci s ion Case and 
though they suppot1 a prospec t theory interpreta tion , they 
are not consistent with a se lf-justi fication theory 
interpretation. Seem ingly, esca lation behaviors very 
similar to those observed by Staw no longer occur if low 
responsibili ty subj ects are induced to frame similarl y to 
high responsibility subj ects. Furthem1ore, low 
responsibi lity subj ects induced to frame as recovering 
losses escalate more than low responsibi lity subj ects who 
have framed as preservin g initi al wea lth . These 
di fferences in escalation behav ior cann ot be expl ained as 
se lf-justification since neither group had any personal 
responsibili ty for the earli er deci sions. Together our 
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fin dings ra ise interesting questions about self-just ificat ion 
as the expl anation for escalation in the present context . 
Some may cri tic ize our tests for relying on a 
hypothetica l deci sion case with student subjects rather 
than real world events and decision-makers. Artificia li ty 
has long been a va li d criticism of laboratory research . We 
must note however that nea rl y a ll ex isting esca lation 
research including Staw ' s seminal 1976 study is based on 
these same artificial contexts . Furthermore, it was the A 
& S Financial Decision Case outcome that Staw used as 
the bas is for concluding (without sufficient evidence in 
our view) that self-j ustification motivates escalating 
commitment to fa iling courses of action. This inference 
has remained large ly untested and is not well supported 
wi th unambi guous empirical evidence. 
Whyte questioned Staw 's inference of self-
justifi cation on a theoretical basis and suggested prospect 
theory is a more parsimoni ous explanation. We have 
presented here modest empirical evidence within the 
same experimental setting suggesting se lf-justification 
theory is inconsistent with the escalation behaviors 
observed . The data show, after e li minating framing 
differences as a confound, self-justification no longer 
predicts what occurs in the context tested . In an 
admittedly artificia l and narrow context of the A & S 
Financial Deci sion Case, prospect theory better expl ains 
what has been observed. 
Add itional evidence is needed of course, and in more 
compelling and less artificia l dec ision settings before 
fina l conclusions can be drawn about the efficacy of self-
j ustifi ca tion as a pa1 ia l cause fo r esca lation. In stronger, 
more reali stic deci sion contexts with stronger ego 
in vo lvement, perhaps se lf-j ustifi cation can provide a 
s ignifi cant in rlependent motivation for escalation. Testing 
of thi s type need not be limited to business and financia l 
contexts but should be broadened to explore other 
continuing deci sions in areas such as medica l decision-
making or political deci sion-making. H owever, unti l 
empirical evidence is free of the framing confound 
common to most exi sting escalati on research is available , 
se lf-ju stification rem a ins in our view a speculati ve, 
untested and perhaps inaccurate ex pl anat ion fo r 
esca lation behavior . 
Finally, we have not intended thi s ev idence to be final 
and conclusive that self-justifi cati on is not a viabl e source 
of esca lating comm itment. No sing le study and certainl y 
not one as nanow and artifi c ial as thi s could do that. 
What we have attempted to do is rai se interestin g 
questi ons about the nature of the esca lation beha vio rs 
fi rst observed by Staw in the contex t of the A & S 
Fi nancial Deci sion Case, and more important ly ra ise 
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questions about the inferences drawn from them. A long 
stTeam of research has fo llowed Sta w that assumes sel !-
j ustifi cation is the major cause of esca lati on. ln our 
op ini on , too littl e empiri ca l scrutiny has been given to 
thi s assumption. 
ln conc lusion, we ha ve asked and attempted to answer 
the questi on: do observed escalation behaviors support or 
contradict se l f-j usti fi cation theory as an exp lanati on for 
escalating commitment after removi ng framin g 
d iffe rences as a confound ? In the context of Staw's 1976 
A & S Financial Decision Case (w ith an expanded 
design) , we find that prospect theory better fi ts observed 
esca lation beha viors than sel f-j usti fication theory. 
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